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ADMINISTRATION OF WAR 
JOHN YOO† 
INTRODUCTION 
“Of all the cares or concerns of government,” Alexander 
Hamilton wrote, “the direction of war most peculiarly demands those 
qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”1 
“The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength,” 
he continued in Federalist 74, “and the power of directing and 
employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in 
the definition of the executive authority.”2 To avoid the “mischiefs” 
and “dissensions” that would arise from multiple commanders, the 
Framers vested the power to conduct war, the Commander-in-Chief 
power, in a single president.3 
This decision, over which there was little dissent in the 
Philadelphia or state ratifying conventions,4 might lead one to think 
that the president would exercise greater control over the military 
than over any other part of the executive branch. We do not 
commonly think of the armed forces of the United States as an 
agency, in part because it does not fall within the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s basic provisions. Nonetheless, the military is part of 
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 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 2. Id. 
 3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 473 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 4. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 153–55 (2005); Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of 
Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 772–74; Saikrishna Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, 
The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 285 (2001). 
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the permanent government, as are the other agencies, and indeed is 
the most important and the oldest—the army and navy were created 
to protect the nation’s security during the Revolutionary War, 
predating the Constitution itself. 
Academic and judicial debates over the chief executive’s 
direction of the administrative state have centered over whether 
Article II’s grant of “the Executive Power” included the authority to 
remove all subordinate officers of the United States.5 Presidents have 
long argued that their executive power includes the power to remove 
inferior officers without the permission of Congress, thereby giving 
them the authority to direct the operations of the executive branch. 
Critics respond that Congress’s constitutional authority to create 
administrative agencies in the first place should give it the ability to 
condition the removal of their officers. Article II contains no 
discussion of removal; it only describes the Senate’s joint “advice and 
consent” role in the appointment of principal officers and Congress’s 
role in the creation of inferior offices.6 The Constitution could be read 
to require the same process for the removal of officers as for their 
appointment. 
The judiciary has not fully accepted either argument. In 
Morrison v. Olson,7 the Supreme Court recognized that “there are 
some ‘purely executive’ officials who must be removable by the 
President at will if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional 
role.”8 Nonetheless, it also allowed Congress to make officers 
removable only “for cause” if the need for independence from 
presidential control is great enough and does not interfere with the 
executive’s constitutional functions.9 Thus, the Court upheld the 
independent counsel’s protections from presidential removal because 
 
 5. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–93 (1988) (“good cause” removal 
provision for independent counsel does not impermissibly burden president’s power to control 
executive officials); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722–23, 726–27 (1986) (“[W]e conclude that 
Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution 
of the laws except by impeachment.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 596–97 (1994) (president must have 
removal power to maintain control over executive branch personnel); Lawrence Lessig & Cass 
R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26–28 & n.119 (1994) 
(no consensus among Framers that president had complete authority to remove inferior 
officers). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 7. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 654. 
 8. Id. at 690 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–29 (1935)). 
 9. Id. at 687, 689–91 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631). 
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its independence was necessary to secure the impartial investigation 
of the president and his advisers, while, according to the Court, the 
president and the attorney general still retained some ability to direct 
its activities.10 
At issue in these debates are more than simply personnel issues 
such as firing underperforming employees. Power over removal is a 
proxy for control over the administrative state. According to 
proponents of a broad reading of Article II, a president must have the 
unrestricted authority to fire an officer to ensure that all subordinates 
in the executive branch obey his commands.11 Otherwise, the 
president cannot ensure a uniform interpretation and enforcement of 
the Constitution and other federal laws, as required by Article II’s 
Take Care Clause. Defenders of congressional prerogatives claim that 
the power of administration goes unmentioned in Article II, and so 
the legislature can create and regulate it.12 Expanded congressional 
control is also necessary, according to some accounts, to balance the 
vast growth of presidential power during and since the New Deal 
revolution. 
Presidential control over the armed forces has been missing from 
these debates, perhaps because the Administrative Procedure Act 
contains significant exceptions for military activity.13 But presidential 
control over the Armed Forces presents a number of difficult 
questions that test the links between constitutional authority and 
control over the administrative state. In the military sphere, for 
example, the Commander-in-Chief Clause’s placement in Article II 
seems to grant presidents a level of control over this most important 
 
 10. Id. at 691–93. 
 11. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 597 (“Inferior executive officers are, 
after all, the President’s men and women, assisting him in the exercise of his constitutional 
powers. If he decides that they are impeding his administrative program or are simply doing a 
poor job in providing what Hamilton might have called an ‘energetic’ administration, he must 
be able to replace them with others.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 47, 54 (“[B]eyond these enumerated 
aspects of ‘the executive power’ is an undefined range of powers that we would now describe as 
‘administrative power,’ marking a domain within which one has a duty to act according not to 
one’s own judgment, but according to the standards or objectives of a law. With respect to these 
latter powers, Congress has wide discretion to vest them in officers operating under or beyond 
the plenary power of the President.”). 
 13. The Administrative Procedure Act excludes from its definition of an “agency” both 
“courts martial and military commissions” and “military authority exercised in the field in time 
of war or in occupied territory.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(F)–(G) (2006). It also excludes from its 
rulemaking and adjudication requirements “military or foreign affairs” functions. Id. 5 U.S.C. § 
553(a)(1) (2006) (rulemaking); id. § 554(a)(4) (adjudication). 
YOO IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:29:58 AM 
2280 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2277 
of agencies that goes beyond the removal power. The clause 
constitutionally guarantees the president’s authority to issue binding 
orders to subordinate officers.14 Even if inferior officers refused to 
carry out presidential orders, the Commander-in-Chief Clause would 
seem to include the power to promote or demote officers and to make 
duty assignments. These powers would be central components of a 
president’s ability to decide on strategy and tactics and ensure that 
the officers who are in place will carry them out. Ultimately, the 
clause might be read as an alternative source for a removal power, 
albeit one that applied only to military officers, even if Article II’s 
Vesting Clause was thought not to provide one for the executive 
branch as a whole. 
Functional reasons for a presidential removal power over the 
military supplement those arising from the formal constitutional text 
and structure. War demands a unity of purpose and command; the 
stakes are high, if not the highest. “Decision, activity, secrecy, and 
dispatch” are at a premium.15 Conflicting orders from different 
commanders, or even the creation of ambiguity, could spell military 
disaster.16 The executive, as Hamilton observed in the eighteenth 
century and Justice Sutherland in the twentieth, is structured for 
speed and decisiveness in the conduct of foreign affairs.17 “In the 
conduct of war, in which the energy of the executive is the bulwark of 
the national security,” Hamilton wrote, “every thing would be to be 
apprehended from its plurality.”18 Instead, “the arrangement of the 
army and navy, the direction of the operations of war,” Publius 
continued in Federalist 72, “constitute what seems to be most 
properly understood by the administration of government,” and 
hence “falls peculiarly within the province of the executive 
department.”19 As Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court in United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright:20 “In this vast external realm, with its 
 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States . . . .”). 
 15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 472. 
 16. See id. (“Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise [sic] the 
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater 
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.”). 
 17. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 476. 
 19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 20. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
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important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the 
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of 
the nation.”21 Quoting from a Senate report, Justice Sutherland 
further explained that “[t]he nature of transactions with foreign 
nations . . . requires caution and unity of design, and their success 
frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.”22 Regardless of one’s 
view of executive control over the civilian agencies, these 
considerations persuade that the president enjoys an elevated 
constitutional authority over the military. 
This makes all the more puzzling one of the striking 
developments in administrative law under President George W. Bush: 
the reduction in the executive’s control over the armed forces. 
Administrative law scholarship has generally passed over the study of 
the military in favor of the domestic agencies. This is an oversight, 
because the armed forces are arguably the most important of all of 
the elements of the administrative state. Military interference in 
civilian affairs is of great concern in many other countries, as it was to 
the Framers in their worry about standing armies.23 Modern and 
ancient history is replete with examples of generals overthrowing 
civilian governments. Civilian control of the military is perhaps the 
most important principle of the American constitutional system of 
government. Yet it is expressed nowhere in the document except in 
the Commander-in-Chief Clause, which scholars primarily discuss in 
terms of its role in the war powers debate.24 
Administrative law scholarship should pay attention to the 
armed forces not just because it performs the most important function 
of the executive branch, but because it is the largest part of the 
executive branch. Expenditures for the Defense Department reached 
$530 billion in 2007, and are estimated to rise to $583 billion in 2008 
and $651 billion in 2009 before supplemental bills for the Afghanistan 
and Iraq conflicts are included.25 Military spending will consume 21 
percent of the federal budget in 2009, down from 47 percent in 1962, 
but will still constitute the second largest source of government 
 
 21. Id. at 319. 
 22. Id. (citation omitted). 
 23. See YOO, supra note 4, at 55–87 (describing Anti-Federalist fear of standing armies). 
 24. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 12–14 (2d ed. 2004); YOO, supra 
note 4, at 143–55. 
 25. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET 
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 49 (2008), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/browse.html. 
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spending after welfare and entitlement programs (24 percent).26 In 
2007, 1.4 million men and women served in the armed forces27 and 
651,000 civilians worked in the Defense Department, while 1.2 million 
civilians served in the rest of the executive branch.28 The military’s 
large workforce and nationwide reach has led to a steady expansion 
of its responsibilities, including not just national defense but also drug 
interdiction, border control, and disaster relief.29 
To the extent that administrative law scholars have touched on 
the military, they have tended to focus on the question of delegated 
authority, with James Q. Wilson’s study of army bureaucracy being an 
important exception.30 In the war on terrorism, the debate has 
centered on whether the president can exercise independent 
constitutional authority to conduct hostilities in response to the 9/11 
attacks, whether Congress must authorize the use of military force, 
and what the limits of Congress’s authorization might be. Cass 
Sunstein and Eric Posner, for example, turn to administrative law 
principles, such as the familiar Chevron doctrine and clear statement 
rules, to understand what deference is due to the president in 
interpreting the Authorization to Use Military Force, passed on 
September 18, 2001, the Detainee Treatment Act, and other foreign 
relations statutes.31 This inquiry applies understandings of the 
 
 26. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 
80 tbl.4.2 (2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/hist.pdf. These figures 
do not include the effects of the stimulus bill passed by Congress in early 2009 to address an 
economic recession. 
 27. Id. at 335 tbl.17.5. 
 28. Id. at 329 tbl.17.1. 
 29. Military doctrine refers to these efforts as “military operations other than war,” which 
includes the support of civilian authorities during crises and disaster relief. Discussion of 
military doctrine in these areas can be found in U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-
19: DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS (1993). One of the more significant expansions of the 
military role in domestic affairs occurred with the passage of the 1981 Military Cooperation with 
Law Enforcement Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371–74 (2006), which permitted extensive military support 
for anti-drug operations. Nonetheless, the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006), forbids 
the military from enforcing the law within the United States, unless otherwise permitted by the 
Constitution or other federal laws. 
 30. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989). 
 31. See generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007) (applying Chevron to foreign relations law, both directly and by 
analogy); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 (2005) 
(applying “the logic of Chevron . . . to the exercise of executive authority in the midst of war”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 
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delegation of authority to the administrative state to delineate the 
boundaries of the president’s authority to use force, and its subsidiary 
issues, in war. 
This Essay seeks to expand the field of inquiry. Delegations of 
wartime authority to the executive branch are a subset of the broader 
issue of control of the military, just as studying a single statutory 
delegation of rulemaking falls within the larger story of the struggle 
between the president, Congress, and the courts for direction of the 
administrative state. Are the armed forces implementing the policies 
of the president and Congress, how much freedom does it have to 
pursue its own preferences, what mechanisms exist to control the 
military, and what influence should judicial review have on control? 
The absence of any military coups in American history might lead 
one to think that civilian control of the military in the United States is 
safe and sound. But this conclusion causes scholars to overlook the 
same interesting questions that characterize the study of the 
administrative state: whether the armed forces have pursued their 
own policy preferences by subtly dividing the political leadership, 
pushed forward in areas of statutory ambiguity or lax presidential 
monitoring, and limited the options presented to civilians. This Essay 
begins to address these questions. Part I describes the military’s 
growing policy independence. Part II proposes a framework—the 
principal-agent model—to analyze that growing independence. 
Finally, Part III, explores how presidents can reduce military-civilian 
tensions through centralization and decentralization. 
I. THE MILITARY’S GROWING INDEPENDENCE 
Broadening the inquiry beyond well-known examples of conflict, 
such as President Harry Truman’s firing of General Douglas 
MacArthur or President Abraham Lincoln’s removal of General 
George McClellan,32 leads to important perspectives on relations 
between the civilian and military leadership during the Bush 
administration. Military historians and scholars observe that civilian-
military relations have been in something of a crisis since the end of 
 
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (tracing clear statement rules in national security versus individual liberties 
cases throughout American history to the present). 
 32. See generally ELIOT COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND: SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND 
LEADERSHIP IN WARTIME (2002). 
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the Cold War.33 What some scholars view as a serious problem can be 
understood as the success of the military in gaining significant policy 
independence from the political leadership. Descriptively, this is no 
different than the account of a federal agency managing to prevail in 
pursuing its own preferences at the expense of those of the president 
or Congress. This Part will describe the military’s growing policy 
independence from civilian control; then Part II will propose a model 
for understanding it. 
President Truman’s firing of General MacArthur provides an 
example of the signs of the relevant phenomenon.34 General 
MacArthur was not conspiring to overthrow civilian government.35 
Instead, he wanted a space for policy independence from civilian 
preferences.36 At the time of his removal, General MacArthur was 
one of the United States’ most distinguished military leaders. In 
defeating the Japanese in World War II, he had recovered more 
territory, with fewer forces at his disposal, and with less casualties, 
than American forces on the European front.37 He had governed the 
reconstruction of Japan and reversed American defeat in Korea with 
the daring landing at Inchon.38 After Communist China intervened in 
late 1950, MacArthur demanded that American forces expand the 
conflict into China proper to pursue victory on the peninsula.39 
President Truman, however, decided that the United States would 
limit the fighting to Korea and seek a settlement along pre-war 
borders.40 When MacArthur continued to make public statements at 
odds with civilian policy, Truman fired him.41 MacArthur returned to 
the United States to a hero’s welcome. When addressing a joint 
session of Congress, he questioned whether military officers owed 
“primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the 
 
 33. See generally Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the 
United States Today, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 2002, at 9 (demonstrating that, although 
there may be no crisis, “civilian control has diminished to the point where it could alter the 
character of American government and undermine national defense”). 
 34. For a popular history, see generally WILLIAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: 
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880–1964 (1978). 
 35. Id. at 629–30. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 690–91. 
 38. Id. at 439–628. 
 39. Id. at 601–22. 
 40. Id. at 622. 
 41. Id. at 643–44. 
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authority of the executive branch of Government, rather than to the 
country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend.”42 
After General MacArthur’s firing, civilian-military relations 
continued without many problems. This is not to say that there were 
no strains on the relationship during specific crises, such as the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, where the Kennedy administration worried that 
military leaders might spark a war without authorization, or during 
longer struggles, such as the Vietnam War. The lessons some 
prominent thinkers in the armed forces took away from the Vietnam 
War, however, was not that the strategy or tactics were mistaken, but 
that the military had allowed civilians to intrude too deeply into 
operational decisions.43 Despite, or perhaps because of, the stresses of 
the Vietnam War and Soviet strategic parity in the 1970s, however, 
military leaders appeared generally to defer to civilian control during 
the Cold War period.44 The most influential thinker on civil-military 
relations during the Cold War, Samuel Huntington, had predicted 
that the level of external threat from the Soviet Union would pressure 
American society to become more conservative—in the sense of 
limitations on individual rights and less suspicion of the military—and 
to make the armed forces more professional and independent from 
society.45 Yet leading scholars have observed that civilian control over 
the military did not suffer significant disruptions under the pressures 
of the Cold War.46 Rather, it was the end of the Cold War that 
ushered in a deterioration in the relationship.47 
Poor relations began with the election of Bill Clinton, the first 
president since World War II who had not served in the military. 
Observers speculate that the military already had its doubts about 
Clinton even before he assumed office, because of his apparent 
efforts to avoid the Vietnam War draft.48 Clinton’s focus on domestic 
 
 42. 97 CONG. REC. app. at A4722 (1951) (statement of General Douglas MacArthur). 
 43. The most influential work along these lines is probably H.R. MCMASTER, 
DERELICTION OF DUTY: LYNDON JOHNSON, ROBERT MCNAMARA, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF, AND THE LIES THAT LED TO VIETNAM (1997). 
 44. See MICHAEL C. DESCH, CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY: THE CHANGING 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 22–29 (1999). 
 45. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND 
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 456–57, 463–64 (1957). 
 46. DESCH, supra note 44, at 22–35. 
 47. Id. 
 48. DALE R. HERSPRING, THE PENTAGON AND THE PRESIDENCY: CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS FROM FDR TO GEORGE W. BUSH 335 (2005) (“The generals and admirals had 
reservations about Clinton when he came to office. First, there was the issue of the draft. Like 
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affairs reinforced the view that he was uninterested in foreign affairs49 
and intended to use the military to engage in experiments on the role 
of gays and women in society.50 Officers were disturbed by Clinton’s 
decisionmaking style, which was somewhat ad hoc, resistant to formal 
structures and processes, and always open to change.51 It did not help 
matters that the administration’s budgets sought a “peace dividend” 
through reduced defense spending.52 Officers believed that Clinton’s 
leadership in conflicts—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo—was 
lacking and that he was calling on the military to perform missions 
that distracted from the winning of wars.53 
President Clinton’s decision to reverse the military’s ban on 
openly gay soldiers, made four days after he assumed office, 
guaranteed conflict with the armed services.54 General Colin Powell, 
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly opposed Clinton’s 
position.55 Military leaders conducted a lobbying effort in Congress to 
reverse the president’s decision and leaked stories to the press that 
mass resignations would occur when his decision took effect.56 They 
cooperated with retired officers, who publicly criticized the 
commander-in-chief’s decision.57 Ultimately, Clinton backed down 
and adopted the “don’t ask, don’t tell policy” favored by Powell and 
the Joint Chiefs and later adopted by statute.58 Civilian and uniformed 
leaders struggled over other social issues, such as sexual harassment 
and the role of women in combat, for the rest of the Clinton 
administration. 
Tension in civil-military relations rose sharply over the use of 
force abroad. Military officers attributed the debacle in Somalia to 
 
many of his compatriots, Clinton did his best to manipulate the system to avoid being drafted 
during the Vietnam War.”). 
 49. Id. at 333. 
 50. Id. at 338. 
 51. Id. at 332. 
 52. Id. at 297. 
 53. See id. at 331–35. 
 54. See Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 1 PUB. PAPERS 23 
(Jan. 29, 1993). 
 55. HERSPRING, supra note 48, at 341 (noting that Powell publicly stated that 
“homosexuality is not a benign behavior characteristic such as skin color”). 
 56. See, e.g., Melissa Healy, Uproar over Gays in Military Muted at Ft. Knox, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 1992, at A1 (“In Washington, where the political battle over lifting the ban [on gays in 
the military] has already been joined, top commanders have warned pointedly of the potential 
for plunging morale, mass resignations, and a breakdown in discipline . . . .”). 
 57. Id. at 339. 
 58. See id. at 342. 
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mission creep—the Clinton administration had expanded a limited 
intervention to provide humanitarian aid into a nation-building 
exercise.59 When eighteen American soldiers died during a strike 
against a Somali warlord, some military officers blamed the civilian 
political leadership for refusing to authorize the dispatch of armored 
units. The human rights crisis in the former Yugoslavia brought 
military resistance to the Clinton administration’s approach to the use 
of force out into the open. General Powell, while serving as chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs, gave an on-the-record interview to the New York 
Times opposing military intervention in Bosnia60 and wrote an 
opinion piece in the same newspaper a month before the 1992 
presidential elections explaining why.61 Powell sought to influence 
policy before civilians in both the executive branch and Congress had 
decided how to stop Serbian attacks on Bosnian Muslims. When the 
Clinton administration attempted to develop a policy in the spring of 
1993, Powell continued to oppose any use of ground troops and 
advised that air strikes would have limited effect.62 
Resistance to White House preferences extended to 
international law as well. In 1997, countries opened for signature an 
international convention to ban the use of anti-personnel land 
mines.63 The United States participated in the negotiations and all of 
its NATO allies joined the treaty, although major powers such as 
Russia and China did not.64 President Clinton apparently wanted the 
United States to join the convention, but the military successfully 
lobbied inside the executive branch to scuttle the idea.65 The Clinton 
administration also sent a team to participate in the drafting of the 
Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court in 
1998.66 Even though President Clinton signed the treaty, it had little 
 
 59. Id. at 343–48 (describing disagreement between President Clinton and military leaders 
with regard to the scope of the military’s mission in Somalia). 
 60. Michael R. Gordon, Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in 
Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at A1. 
 61. Colin L. Powell, Why Generals Get Nervous, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at A35. 
 62. HERSPRING, supra note 52, at 355–56. 
 63. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. 
 64. Christopher W. Jacobs, Taking the Next Step: An Analysis of the Effects the Ottawa 
Convention May Have on the Interoperability of United States Forces with the Armed Forces of 
Australia, Great Britain, and Canada, 180 MIL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2004). 
 65. Kohn, supra note 33, at 21. 
 66. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
(entered into force July 1, 2002). 
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chance of Senate approval and President Bush “un-signed” the treaty 
with the broad backing of the uniformed military.67 
Civil-military relations continued to worsen under President 
George W. Bush, brought on by the stresses of the Afghanistan 
conflict and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This is not what would have 
been predicted at the outset of the Bush administration, which had 
campaigned on increases in military spending and an end to the lack 
of respect for the military that had roiled the Clinton years. Yet even 
before the September 11, 2001, attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and the uniformed military struggled over the 
administration’s “transformation” policy to make American forces 
lighter, faster, and better equipped for unconventional conflict by 
relying on high-technology and information advantages.68 Rumsfeld 
also came to office believing that military leaders had grown too 
independent under the previous administration and intending to 
reassert stronger civilian control.69 Afghanistan seemed to bear out 
the Secretary’s agenda. Rumsfeld ordered heavy bombing and the 
quick insertion of light special forces and CIA units over the Army’s 
recommendation of 50,000 to 60,000 troops. Quick success in toppling 
the Taliban, in a country where no foreign power had prevailed 
before, reinforced Rumsfeld’s belief in transformation and in 
overruling the advice of military commanders.70 
The war in Iraq brought the struggle between the civilian and 
military leadership out into the open. Pentagon leaders feuded openly 
with General Eric Shinseki, the army chief of staff. Secretary 
Rumsfeld announced Shinseki’s replacement fourteen months before 
his scheduled retirement, during fights over the cancellation of the 
Crusader artillery system. Shinseki then testified before Congress in 
the spring of 2003 that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be 
needed to secure Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of 
defense, criticized Shinseki’s estimate as “wildly off the mark” and 
said the more accurate figure was 100,000 troops.71 Wrestling privately 
with General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander, Rumsfeld 
pressed for a small force to invade Iraq, on the order of 50,000 to 
75,000 troops, whereas the United States had deployed about 500,000 
 
 67. Kohn, supra note 33, at 19 n.52. 
 68. Id. at 14. 
 69. HERSPRING, supra note 48, at 381. 
 70. Id. at 388. 
 71. Id. at 395. 
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troops in the 1991 Gulf War and military planners called for at least 
250,000 in 2003.72 Although the eventual force was light, it defeated 
Iraq’s military with surprising speed and low casualties, but was 
insufficient to secure and occupy the nation post-invasion. 
As conditions worsened in Iraq after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, the military became more critical of Secretary 
Rumsfeld. Military officers anonymously criticized the Secretary for 
refusing to send enough troops to pacify the country, and generally 
attacked him for ignoring their advice and counsel. In an April 2006 
act known in the military as the “revolt of the generals,” dozens of 
senior retired military officers called for Rumsfeld’s resignation for 
allegedly mismanaging the war.73 In 2006, retired general Gregory 
Newbold, former director of operations of the Joint Chiefs, wrote an 
essay in Time declaring that it was his “sincere view . . . that the 
commitment of forces to this fight was done with a casualness and 
swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to 
execute these missions – or bury the results.”74 Part of the impetus for 
the revolt was the deeper lesson, taken by the officer corps from 
Vietnam, that the military had been too subservient to civilian leaders 
and that they should talk straight to the political leadership about 
their views. Ironically, the 2007–08 surge in forces in Iraq and the 
improvement in the country’s rebuilding came against the advice of 
the senior military leadership, which had decided that the size of the 
American footprint in Iraq was part of the problem.75 
Dissension over Iraq was matched by contention over the 
continuing war on terrorism. Perhaps the most public example was 
Congress’s consideration of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
 
 72. Id. at 399. 
 73. Michael Duffy, The Revolt of the Generals, TIME, Apr. 24, 2006, at 41, 41. 
 74. Greg Newbold, Why Iraq Was a Mistake, TIME, Apr. 17, 2006, at 43, 43. 
 75. See Michael C. Desch, Bush and the Generals, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 104–05 (2007) 
(“[S]enior U.S. Commanders believed increasing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq would be 
counterproductive . . . [b]ut despite such protests, the military leadership was once again 
overruled by civilians in Washington—leading to the ‘surge’ taking place right now.”); Richard 
B. Myers & Richard H. Kohn, Response, The Military’s Place, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 147, 148 (2007) 
(noting that senior military officials opposed increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq until 
shortly after the 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra). But see Mackubin Thomas 
Owens, Response, Failure’s Many Fathers, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 149, 150 (2007) (arguing that 
military leadership had a habit of exaggerating the need for troops overseas to protect the size 
of the defense budget or to discourage the executive from deploying a new mission). 
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(MCA),76 which established rules for the detention and military trials 
of terrorists. In November 2001, President Bush issued an executive 
order establishing military commissions, in the form of a military 
tribunal, to try al Qaeda members and their allies for war crimes.77 
Some members of the military’s Judge Advocate Generals (JAG) 
corps wanted to use courts-martial instead, but civilian leaders in the 
Pentagon favored commissions, which promised a flexible balance 
between the need for an open, fair proceeding and the need to keep 
national security secrets. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,78 the Supreme 
Court held that the tribunals had to operate according to the lines set 
out in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,79 setting off 
Congress’s consideration of the 2006 Act. During congressional 
hearings, JAGs for the Marines and the Army testified that 
commission rules withholding classified evidence from the defendant, 
but not his lawyer, would still violate the Geneva Conventions, 
whereas the civilian representative of the Department of Justice 
testified to the opposite effect.80 
Military disagreement over civilian policy in the war on terrorism 
extended back to the beginning of the conflict. JAGs challenged 
President Bush’s decision in February 2002, after extensive debate 
within the executive branch, that members of al Qaeda and the 
Taliban were not to receive the status of prisoners of war under the 
Geneva Conventions.81 After that decision, JAGs reportedly 
cooperated with private human rights groups to challenge the 
decision in federal court. Once uniformed lawyers were appointed to 
represent detainees in the military commission process, they 
 
 76. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in 
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 77. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002). 
 78. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 79. Id. at 626. For discussion of the decision, see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1234 n.10 (2007) (providing a brief 
summary of the Hamdan case); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional 
Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 181–99 
(2006) (discussing the facts in Hamdan and the arguments presented by each side); Posner & 
Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1223 (analyzing Hamdan under the Chevron doctrine established in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) 
 80. The Authority to Prosecute Terrorists Under the War Crime Provisions of Title 18: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 81. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, Military Fought to Abide by War Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 
2006, at A1 (chronicling disagreement between JAGs and the White House over military 
commissions from 9/11 to the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld). 
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dispensed with the secrecy and filed suit against the Bush 
administration directly.82 Members of the uniformed military also 
challenged the legality of holding suspected al Qaeda at the U.S. 
Navy Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.83 According to media 
reports, JAGs representing detainees in the military commission 
process met with members of Congress to seek their assistance in 
reversing Bush administration policies on detainees.84 Congress’s 
enactment of the MCA hewed closely to civilian preferences on the 
commissions and the designation of al Qaeda as illegal combatants. 
Although the Supreme Court, in Boumediene v. Bush,85 reversed the 
MCA’s effort to prohibit federal habeas corpus review over the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay,86 it has not yet addressed the 
substance of the MCA. 
All of this has led historians and political scientists to warn of a 
crisis in civil-military relations. Russell Weigley, a prominent military 
historian, compared General Powell’s resistance to intervention in 
Bosnia to General McClellan’s reluctance to engage General Lee 
during the Civil War.87 By 2002, Richard Kohn, a distinguished 
military historian, had already concluded that “civilian control of the 
military has weakened in the United States and is threatened today.”88 
According to Kohn, “the American military has grown in influence to 
the point of being able to impose its own perspective on many policies 
and decisions.”89 He detects “no conspiracy but repeated efforts on 
the part of the armed forces to frustrate or evade civilian authority 
when that opposition seems likely to preclude outcomes the military 
dislikes.”90 He believes that civilian-military relations in that period 
are as poor as in any other period in American history.91 Michael 
Desch argues that the high tensions in civil-military relations are due 
 
 82. See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 47 (detailing the lawsuit brought by Salim Hamdan and his 
appointed JAG counsel challenging Hamdan’s detention at Guantanamo Bay). 
 83. See id. 
 84. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 81 (noting that JAGs argued that it was “a mistake to 
ignore the long traditions of military justice when trying terrorism suspects”). 
 85. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 86. Id. at 2262. 
 87. Russell Weigley, The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from 
McClellan to Powell, 57 J. MIL. HIST. 27, 31–32 (1993). 
 88. Kohn, supra note 33, at 9. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 10. 
YOO IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:29:58 AM 
2292 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2277 
not to the military but to the civilians, which have violated 
Huntington’s advice in favor of “objective control” by giving the 
military broad discretion over tactics and operations while keeping 
final say over politics and grand strategy.92 In a 1999 study, Desch 
found that civilians prevailed in almost all of the seventy-five civil-
military disputes from 1938 to 1997, but that the military has won in 
seven or eight of the twelve post–Cold War conflicts.93 Some attribute 
this discord to the regular give-and-take inherent in the civil-military 
relationship, whereas others believe that the military has grown bold 
in questioning the foreign policy decisions of the civilian leadership.94 
II. PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORIES OF MILITARY CONTROL 
The deterioration in civil-military relations shows the relative 
poverty of the focus on the removal power as the primary means of 
control of the administrative state. The president’s constitutional 
authority to fire personnel is at its height with regard to the military. 
There is no system similar to the civil service protections that shield 
non-political appointees from removal. Other formal tools of control 
are also greater over the armed forces than over other civilian 
agencies. The president chooses which officers to nominate for 
promotions, though every promotion requires Senate advice and 
consent too.95 Although the great majority of appointments do not 
require White House scrutiny, the appointment of general officers 
and combat commands determines which military careers continue 
and which ones end. The president can issue orders to the military 
that have the force of criminal law behind them. Failure to obey an 
order from a superior officer—and the president, as the commander-
in-chief, is the top commander in the military—is a prosecutable 
offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.96 No similar 
sanctions apply to civil servants in the civilian agencies who refuse to 
carry out a presidential directive. 
Heightened tensions in the civil-military relationship during the 
Bush administration illustrate the need for a more subtle 
 
 92. Desch, supra note 75, at 105–06. 
 93. DESCH, supra note 44, app. at 135–38. 
 94. See Herspring, supra note 48, at 342–76; Myers & Kohn, supra note 75, at 147; Owens, 
supra note 75, at 149 (stating that the “military deserves a significant share of the blame” for the 
deterioration of the relationship between U.S. military leaders and civilians). 
 95. See 10 U.S.C. § 624 (2004); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 166 (1994). 
 96. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (2006). 
YOO IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:29:58 AM 
2009] ADMINISTRATION OF WAR 2293 
understanding of agency control. If elected leaders have trouble with 
the military, over which their constitutional powers are strongest, 
then their problems will be doubled with the civilian agencies. A 
principal-agent approach, developed first in the context of 
congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to civilian agencies, 
may suggest ways in which presidents can increase their control over 
the military. 
Under a principal-agent model, initially applied to civil-military 
relations by Peter Feaver, the president is the principal and the 
military is the agent.97 The principal does not have the time and 
resources to conduct military affairs; it delegates that authority to the 
armed forces to take advantage of specialization. The problem is that 
principals and agents have their own interests, and given enough 
leeway, the latter may benefit themselves rather than the principals. 
The classic example from corporate law occurs when management 
locates a corporation in a state with plentiful takeover defenses, 
which reduces the value of shareholders’ equity. Agents may prevail 
by manipulating information or events or by taking advantage of 
deference to their expertise to convince the principals to approve 
policies that allow them to capture more of the benefits. Or agents 
may be able to conceal self-dealing behavior from the observation of 
principals, who delegated authority in the first place to reduce their 
management of the issue.98 In the public administration context, the 
deviation between principal preferences and actual policies carried 
out by the agent is known as “agency slack”99 or “bureaucratic 
drift.”100 The fundamental tradeoff becomes the principal’s desire that 
the agent carry out his wishes, but without consuming resources in 
excessively tightening its control over the agent.101 
 
 97. PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS (2003). For an effort to apply the model to the question of the JAGs’ actions in the 
war on terrorism, see Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: 
A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1831–45 (2007). 
 98. See FEAVER, supra note 97, at 55 (“[T]he employee has an incentive to do as little work 
as he can get away with, all the while sending information back to the employer that suggests he 
is performing at an acceptable level . . . .”). 
 99. See, e.g., Matthew Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 53, 58 (2008). 
 100. Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post 9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1702 (2006). 
 101. See Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 97, at 1826–27 (“Part of the goal in designing laws and 
institutional structures, from the perspective of the principal, is to achieve the right balance 
between the efficient delegation of authority and the costs of monitoring and sanctioning the 
agent.”). 
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A number of methods are available to tighten control over the 
agents. The most obvious is for the principal to be more specific in its 
delegations to the agent.102 Congress, for example, need not delegate 
authority to the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate air 
quality when it is in the public interest—it could instead specify 
ranges for different pollutants. The president can achieve a similar 
end by appointing and promoting personnel who share the same 
policy preferences, and thus will use the delegated power in the 
manner he desires. Congress can impose elaborate monitoring 
mechanisms, such as reporting requirements, oversight hearings, 
causes of action for third parties, and internal inspector generals, 
designed to alert the principal when the agent is straying from its 
wishes. Congress can even give the right to review agency decisions to 
an independent actor, such as the federal courts, as a way of 
monitoring agent activity. 
Monitoring must be married to effective sanctions to counter 
agency slack. In this regard, constitutional law focuses only on the 
bluntest instrument—the removal of agents who fail to obey the 
principal. Although firing a subordinate official may be a very public 
sanction, it may not be calibrated properly to achieve the right change 
in policy. Firing General MacArthur may have been justified because 
of his desire to expand the war in Asia and his unwillingness to obey 
civilian commands, but firing General Powell because he does not 
provide a full range of options for intervention in Bosnia may be 
overkill. Other sanctions could include reducing the scope of 
delegation and hence the autonomy of the agent, cutting an agent’s 
budget and size, transferring authority to another agency, or 
promoting more trustworthy personnel at the expense of existing 
leadership. A critical agency response to increased monitoring and 
sanctions is to fragment the principal—in other words, to encourage 
competing power centers within the principal. 
A few observations are worth making before applying the model 
specifically to civil-military relations. First, ex ante, multiple 
principals may have different preferences about policy and therefore 
may be willing to tolerate different levels of agency autonomy based 
on their ability to control the agent in the future. In creating an 
 
 102. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 431, 440 (1989) (“[T]he best solution is legislative specificity: writing into the law precisely 
what the agency is to achieve, and how it is to do so.”). 
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agency, for example, a majority in Congress may be concerned about 
a future president who may hold different policy preferences. This 
concern will be exacerbated if the majority is uncertain about its 
ability to stay in control of Congress in future elections or the ability 
of its party to win the White House. It will be willing to grant 
significant autonomy to the agency, or to beef up review by an 
independent actor like the courts, rather than allow the president to 
dictate the results.103 Second, ex post, the divergence of principal 
wishes from agency actions will depend on a few variables. The most 
important factor will be whether the preferences of the principal and 
agents deviate significantly. The farther apart that they are, the more 
benefit to the agent of pursuing its own wishes. Another significant 
variable will be the expected cost to the agent of sanctions for failure 
to follow the principal’s preferences—a function of the chances that 
monitoring will discover agency drift, the chances that the principal 
will impose sanctions, and the likely magnitude of those sanctions. 
The more principals spend on monitoring, the more likely they are to 
discover agency shirking; the more they are willing to impose tough 
sanctions, the less benefit the agent receives from shirking. Devoting 
more time and resources to monitoring and sanctioning, however, 
reduces the benefits to the principal of delegating authority to the 
agency in the first place. 
Applied to the military context, it is worth identifying how the 
Bush and Clinton administration and civilian preferences may have 
diverged from those of the armed forces. Unlike the Clinton 
administration, both the civilian and military leadership were on the 
same page in the area of budget and personnel. Under the Bush 
administration, military spending rose sharply, both in absolute terms 
and as a share of the federal budget. As a percentage of the federal 
budget, Defense Department spending rose from 15.6 percent in 2001 
($290 billion) to 21 percent in 2008 ($651 billion).104 Civilian and 
military leaders may very well have disagreed, however, over how 
that money should be spent. As noted earlier, President Bush and 
Secretary Rumsfeld favored a restructuring of the Army to emphasize 
smaller, lighter, and more lethal units that could deploy more quickly 
 
 103. See Stephenson, supra note 99, at 55 (“Forcing the politically responsive president to 
share power with a partially insulated, politically unresponsive bureaucracy tends to reduce the 
variance in policy outcomes, because bureaucratic insulation creates a kind of compensatory 
inertia that mutes the significance of variation in the president’s policy preferences.”). 
 104. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 26, at 74–85 tbls.4.1–2. 
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to fight in smaller conflicts.105 Army officers may well have favored 
keeping the focus on the large armored units designed for a broad 
conflict against a major power such as Russia or China106—hence the 
conflict over the Crusader artillery system and the Comanche attack 
helicopter.107 This tension signaled a larger difference over the 
nation’s strategic goals in the wake of the Cold War’s end. Civilians 
wanted a force shaped for the smaller conflicts, civil wars, nation 
building, and humanitarian missions that characterized the 1990s. 
Military leaders preferred the conflicts envisioned by the “Powell 
doctrine,”108 which emphasized defeating an enemy quickly with 
overwhelming force, defined goals, and a clear exit strategy.109 
The pressure of external events may have exacerbated these 
differences. The actual combat phases of both the Afghanistan and 
Iraq wars were relatively short and involved few casualties for 
American forces. Whereas the latter was a regular international 
conflict between two conventionally armed forces, the former 
involved special forces, covert units, air power, and irregular allies 
fighting a mixture of loosely organized militia units and terrorist 
groups. Afghanistan required the United States to pivot quickly from 
defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda units to rebuilding a national 
government in cooperation with the Northern Alliance victors—a 
task still unfinished. Nation building is at odds with the Powell 
doctrine, because it requires military units to perform a police 
function over the civilian population, with goals that are hard to 
measure and difficult to achieve, and with no preset exit date. Iraq 
called for yet a different kind of strategy, that of counterinsurgency, 
which also deviated from the preferred focus on high-technology 
weapons systems, armored units and air superiority fighters, and 
 
 105. See, e.g., John Hendren, Army Holds Its Ground in Battle with Rumsfeld, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 2002, at A1 (“Rumsfeld . . . has presented a clear, if controversial, vision of modern 
warfare, one that uses fewer infantrymen and relies more on precision airstrikes and on small 
groups of special operation soldiers.”). 
 106. Id. (“Army leaders, who still insist that some military engagements will require large 
ground battles, have grown increasingly alarmed about what role their service plays in 
Rumsfeld’s vision.”). 
 107. See Renae Merle, Army Scraps $39 Billion Helicopter, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2004, at 
A1 (describing the contentious cancellations of the Comanche helicopter and Crusader artillery 
system programs). 
 108. See Benjamin Schwarz, The Post-Powell Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, § 7, at 11 
(reviewing books challenging “contemporary military leaders’ embrace of the Powell doctrine” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 109. See generally Colin L. Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 
1992/93, at 32, 32–45. 
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large-scale conventional warfare. Instead, the armed forces eventually 
had to surge in large numbers of ground troops who patrolled in 
urban environments, cooperated with local leadership structures, and 
relied on intelligence to defeat al Qaeda operatives and Sunni 
resistance fighters. The Army had engaged in counterinsurgency 
operations in South Vietnam, sometimes to great effect, but had since 
lost its expertise in favor of the tactics and strategies needed for a 
conventional conflict.110 
Tension between the civilian and military leadership over the 
tactics in the war on terrorism displayed a similar difference in 
preferences. Civilian leaders believed that the war begun by al Qaeda 
on September 11, 2001, called for a different kind of armed conflict. 
The enemy is not a nation-state, but an international terrorist 
organization that does not hold territory, has no population, and does 
not use regular armed forces.111 Its primary tactic is to send covert 
operatives, using the easy transportation and financial networks of 
the global economy, to launch surprise suicide attacks on purely 
civilian targets.112 It acts in direct violation of the laws of war, which 
call on combatants to clearly distinguish themselves and to refrain 
from targeting civilians.113 The war was not between nation-states, nor 
was it a civil war limited to the territory of a single country—the two 
categories of conflicts recognized by the Geneva Conventions of 
1949.114 
The method of fighting the war was also to be different. Unlike a 
conventional conflict, the United States would not prevail by fielding 
larger armed units, out-producing the enemy, or winning through 
maneuver or attrition. Rather, the gathering and analysis of 
information would allow the military, intelligence, and domestic 
security agencies to prevent terrorist attacks before they happen and 
to target or capture al Qaeda operatives. Close cooperation between 
international and domestic national security agencies was needed 
because of the ease with which al Qaeda could operate across 
 
 110. Scholars, of course, will need the distance of time before they can make firm 
conclusions about the reasons for the counter-insurgency successes in Iraq. For an early 
journalistic account, see generally THOMAS RICKS, THE GAMBLE: GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS 
AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ, 2006–2008 (2009). 
 111. See, e.g., John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 575–76 (2006). 
 112. Id. at 576. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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borders. At the same time, the use of force required the capabilities 
of individual units or unmanned airborne drones more notable for 
their small size and mobility rather than their firepower. Precision of 
targeting, rather than massive force, was the order of the day. 
The military resisted the notion that the conflict with al Qaeda 
was an unprecedented form of warfare. Instead, the JAGs’ resistance 
to the president’s decision on the application of the Geneva 
Conventions can be understood as an effort to fit the war within 
traditional legal concepts. The Geneva Conventions, as originally 
understood, created one set of rules for wars between nations and 
another set for internal civil wars—the only two types of conflicts 
contemplated in 1949 when the treaties were drafted.115 When nations 
decided to extend the Geneva standards to wars of national liberation 
and other asymmetric, unconventional conflicts, they drafted and 
ratified two additional protocols to the conventions in 1977116—an 
effort that the United States did not join precisely because of the 
protections included for terrorists.117 Political leaders wanted to 
continue the policy of not granting terrorists prisoner-of-war status 
under Geneva, but also wanted to keep them in military hands rather 
than turning the matter over to domestic law enforcement. Military 
leaders, by contrast, believed that if the struggle with al Qaeda was to 
be considered a war for which the armed forces could be used, then 
Geneva standards ought to apply automatically. 
The justification for this position shows the desire to keep the 
conflict within traditional military preferences about warfighting. Two 
basic claims were made to support the idea that the Geneva 
Conventions still governed the war with al Qaeda. The first was that 
even if the text of the Conventions did not apply to a terrorist group, 
the norms of Geneva had assumed the status of customary 
international law. The second was a policy argument that if the 
United States did not adhere to Geneva, its enemies would act in the 
 
 115. See Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 97, at 1835 (“[T]he laws of war . . . were drafted 
primarily to deal with two types of armed conflict—wars between nation-states, and internal 
civil wars.”). 
 116. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 117. Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 88, 88 (Jan. 29, 1987) (“[W]e must not, and need not, give recognition and 
protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law.”). 
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identical manner toward its own troops.118 The military’s first 
argument was an appeal to a sort of standard template for war 
developed by the practice of states, one primarily developed by 
nations that conduct few significant military operations on their own. 
The United States, however, had objected to the norm by refusing to 
adopt the 1977 additional protocols. The second argument, 
concerning reciprocal treatment, would apply to a nation-nation 
conflict in which both sides were capturing members of the other’s 
armed forces and were concerned about their treatment as prisoners. 
Al Qaeda, however, has no facilities for holding prisoners on any 
large scale because it controls no territory. Even if it did, the terrorist 
group shows no inclination to take prisoners, but instead has executed 
both civilians and soldiers alike. Whether American extension of 
Geneva to al Qaeda would make any difference in a future war would 
be speculative, but the mistreatment of American POWs by almost 
every enemy faced during the postwar period does not hold out great 
hope. 
Other elements of the war on terrorism would have clashed with 
the sensibilities of an officer corps brought up under the Powell 
doctrine and the lessons of Vietnam. The emphasis on victory 
through overwhelming military force holds little application to war 
with an international terrorist group. The difficulty is not in the 
amount of force, an area in which western nation-states have an 
unchallenged advantage, but knowing where to use it. Focus on a 
clear goal and an exit strategy also finds little traction with the war on 
terrorism. The war on terrorism is more amorphous and less 
transparent than conventional armed conflicts between nation-states. 
Conflict with terrorist groups does not often involve regular armed 
forces units, but instead special forces, predator drones, and CIA and 
NSA assets. It is unclear what the eventual goal is, because ending 
terrorism itself is not possible; terrorism is only a tactic of fighting. 
The goal could be simply the elimination of the al Qaeda terrorist 
organization, though that would be difficult to achieve, and one that 
might not have any publicly identifiable endpoint due to the struggle’s 
decentralized, nonterritorial character. The lack of endpoint of the 
conflict makes the exit strategy question a difficult one to answer. 
The difference in preferences should lead to predictable 
struggles for control over policy. The military will seek to gain 
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autonomy by shaping decision options in its favor, whereas civilian 
principals will increase monitoring and corrective sanctions to return 
agency performance closer to their preferences. To take an earlier 
example, the military drew the lesson from Vietnam that it had to go 
to war with widespread support and sufficient resources for victory 
from the American population, not just from its political leadership. 
Generals decided to reorganize the force structure to incorporate the 
reserves into the units that would be deployed if the nation were to 
engage in any significant conflict, making it difficult for the civilian 
principals to send the military into combat without popular support.119 
Overestimating the forces needed to achieve certain military 
objectives similarly may alter the options actually available to the 
principals. The agent can increase its autonomy further by delaying its 
responsiveness to civilian orders or by providing a limited range of 
information to the principal necessary to make a decision on all policy 
options. 
One visible tactic in the struggle over control was the agents’ 
efforts to divide the principals’ institutional unity. Increasing the 
number of competing power centers among the principal, for 
example, makes it more difficult for the principal to settle on a single 
policy, to monitor effectively, and to decide to increase monitoring or 
sanctions.120 In the war on terrorism, for example, JAG opponents of 
President Bush’s policies went to Congress and testified against the 
administration’s positions on the military commission bill.121 JAG 
lawyers representing detainees at Guantanamo Bay also brought suit 
in federal court to enjoin military commission proceedings from 
taking place.122 Judicial review would provide another disruption in 
the principals’ ability to coordinate policy. The JAGs’ appeal to 
international law is understandable as an effort to create more 
autonomy by introducing foreign governments, international entities 
and NGOs into the principals’ decisionmaking process. 
A number of broader changes in both civilian and military 
personnel may exacerbate the gap in their preferences on particular 
policy questions. The change that has attracted much notice is the 
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growing difference between civilian and military values and 
perspectives, which has expressed itself in a number of ways. Scholars 
have observed that the officer corps, for example, has become 
increasingly Republican in the last few decades, the likely result of 
self-selection, Republican party outreach, and the decline in the 
Democratic party’s hawkish wing after the Vietnam War.123 As a 
result, the agency model would predict more friction during periods 
of Democratic control of the executive branch, but it would not have 
predicted the high levels of conflict under Bush. The introduction of 
the all-volunteer force after Vietnam has reduced the number of 
veterans in society at large and in the civilian political leadership in 
particular, a dynamic enhanced by the reduction of the military’s size 
after the Cold War and a drop in the number of bases throughout the 
country.124 Civilians and military officers have come to have a growing 
difference in both their opinions and their experience. 
There is nothing normatively wrong with a difference in 
preferences between civilians and the military. It is inherent in the 
principal-agent relationship. Principals want to save time and 
resources by delegating authority to agents. The latter naturally 
desire autonomy in pursuing their missions. It is also not surprising 
that in an area as fraught with significance as the nation’s security, 
there will be strong differences in preferences beyond questions 
solely of institutional independence. The phrase “shirking,” when 
used in the literature on business organizations, implies that managers 
are attempting to benefit themselves financially at the expense of the 
shareholders—but it does not have that implication in the analysis of 
the public sector. Rather, as here, it refers to examples when agents 
seek to pursue their own interests rather than those of civilians. 
Shirking, in fact, may better advance overall American national 
security, should military policy preferences actually prove superior to 
civilian preferences on an individual question. But it would come at 
the cost of a reduction in civilian control of the military. 
III. RESTORING CIVILIAN CONTROL 
THROUGH DECENTRALIZATION 
Turning from the descriptive to the normative, this Part asks 
what presidents can do to address the growing tensions in civilian-
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military relations. Under the principal-agent model described here, a 
decrease in civilian control over the military could result from two 
developments. One, deterioration in civil-military relations could 
arise from a growing gap in preferences between the principal and the 
agent over foreign and national security policy, as described in the 
Part II. Two, military preferences may ultimately prevail in policy 
disputes because civilian monitoring may fail to detect shirking or 
because the chances of sanctions in response are low. 
The agency model suggests that civilians can take a number of 
steps to increase their control over the military. I should make clear 
that this is not a matter of whether the military should shape its 
advice based on what it thinks the civilians want to hear—a possible 
concern if agencies are competing for a limited pool of funding from 
the principal. Civilian leaders should want the military’s unvarnished 
advice in order to reach the best decisions. Rather, the agency model 
addresses how civilians can improve the military’s implementation of 
decisions and reduce any effort by the armed forces to narrow or 
unduly influence those decisions in its institutional favor. 
Principals cannot do much immediately to change the 
preferences of their agents, but they can make institutional reforms 
that better detect and correct shirking. Civilians, for example, can 
narrow the delegation of authority to the military by making more 
decisions themselves or issuing more detailed, explicit orders that 
provide for less discretion in implementation. They can enhance the 
monitoring of military decisionmaking to detect efforts to deviate 
from civilian policy preferences. This can be done primarily by 
increasing the number of, and resources available to, civilians 
responsible for developing policy in the Pentagon and on the National 
Security Council staff. They can increase the sanctions for shirking by 
promoting officers who are faithful to civilian wishes, removing 
officers who defy civilian preferences, or reducing the budgets of 
resistant services. 
Several of these changes depend on the president’s constitutional 
authorities. Agents will continue to pursue their own policy 
preferences, even with a high likelihood of discovery, if the expected 
cost of sanctions—the chances that they will be imposed and their 
magnitude—remains low. The toughest sanction is removal from 
office, which falls within the president’s sole constitutional power 
under Article II. But firing will have little effect in response to serious 
agency slack unless it is used with some regularity. A constant 
possibility of sanctions also will not adequately address agency slack if 
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principal and agent preferences grow farther apart, because agents 
will claim more benefits even after the costs of monitoring and 
sanctions. 
This appears to explain developments in civil-military relations 
since the end of the Cold War. It does not appear that civilian 
monitoring or sanctions have fallen; in fact, they may well have risen. 
The tension in civilian-military relations nevertheless has sharpened 
because the difference between civilian and military policy 
preferences has grown at an even faster rate. This should come as no 
surprise. The disappearance of the Soviet threat, which had been the 
overwhelming focus of American military planning for a half-century, 
left both sets of leaders searching for a redefinition of national 
security means and ends. Increasing reliance on the military for 
operations that do not involve combat, such as drug interdiction, 
nation building, and disaster relief, may draw the military more 
deeply into civilian debates, increase the scope for disagreements 
over the role of the military, and place strains on the military’s 
resources and warfighting abilities. An all-volunteer force may have 
exacerbated tensions as the military becomes more separate and 
distinct from civilian society. 
Removal from office may be both too blunt and too narrow a 
tool to improve civil-military relations. It is too blunt because it is 
overinclusive: presidential removal of an officer may arise because of 
a single disagreement over policy, but might be seen as a symbolic 
judgment on the officer’s entire career. Dependence on the 
president’s constitutional authority does not provide more fine-
grained methods of responding to small-scale examples of agency 
slack. It is too narrow because it is an inadequate way to change the 
institutional culture of the agent. If resistance to civilian policy is wide 
and deep because of military culture—as it arguably was during the 
Clinton years—presidents will have to remove a large number of 
officers, perhaps to the point at which military effectiveness will be 
seriously endangered. 
What is needed is a different way to improve control of the 
military that is not dependent solely on firing and promotion 
decisions. One such method is suggested by the comparative study of 
civilian-military relations and the debate over intelligence reform. 
Deborah Avant has observed that civilian control of the military has 
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suffered less in Great Britain than in the United States.125 She finds 
the difference in the former’s lack of a separation of powers between 
the executive and legislative branches, which provides less 
opportunity for the military to play its civilian masters against each 
other.126 Indeed, one way that the U.S. armed forces may have won 
greater policy independence is by dividing the principal by playing 
Congress and the White House off one another. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that this phenomenon may not correlate 
with the end of the Cold War but instead may have been a persistent 
practice in past periods of American history. 
If unifying the principal is one way to increase civilian control, 
dividing the agent may well be another. Dividing the military into 
different services, but with similar missions, for example, may reduce 
its ability to unify in its own struggle with the civilian principals. 
Individual services may be less likely to shirk on civilian priorities if 
they are competing with each other for budgetary and personnel 
resources. Civilian principals can reward agencies who implement 
their priorities most faithfully, or achieve the desired results most 
effectively. This insight is supported by work on the centralization of 
the intelligence community in the United States in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks. The military first went through centralization in the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986,127 which made the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff the primary military adviser to the president.128 
According to Feaver, the chairman’s increase in power came through 
the introduction of the idea of a unified military viewpoint, which 
came at the expense of the individual services.129 A similar impetus 
has driven changes to the intelligence community in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks. Before 9/11, several agencies operated intelligence 
collection or analysis units. The Central Intelligence Agency is only 
the most well known of them: the Defense Department, for example, 
contained the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security 
Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation was responsible for 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence; whereas the Departments 
of Justice, State, Energy, and Treasury each had their own 
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intelligence units. Failures in detecting the 9/11 attacks and in 
predicting the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq both 
led to investigatory commissions that recommended centralization of 
the intelligence community.130 In 2004, Congress enacted the 
Intelligence Reform Act,131 which created a new directorate of 
national intelligence to head the intelligence community and, like the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs on military matters, would act as the 
principal adviser to the president on intelligence.132 
Whether to centralize agencies or create multiple entities 
organized by specialty and expertise is a question that has arisen in 
studies of both the corporate form and bureaucracy. As Oliver 
Williamson has written, a firm that needs a good or service is faced 
with several choices: should it purchase the item in the private 
market, should it merge with or acquire another firm that specializes 
in the function, or should it develop the ability to produce the item 
internally.133 One of Williamson’s answers is that as the uncertainty of 
acquiring the asset through contracting increases, because the good or 
services is rare or must be made to specifications or its supply must be 
dependable, firms will merge or grow larger to produce the product in 
house rather than in the market.134 The reduction in transaction costs 
brought about by performing multiple functions under one roof 
should outweigh the costs in managerial complexity, loss of focus and 
benefits of competition, and inefficiencies in operating a large 
conglomerate.135 This transaction cost approach to understanding 
institutions has important applications to administration—one 
question relevant here is whether it makes sense to aggregate 
different functions in one large agency, such as the Department of 
Defense, or to maintain multiple, specialized agencies with somewhat 
overlapping duties, such as a Department of the Navy and Army. 
In the context of public administration, centralization holds the 
promise of reducing redundancies, promoting coordination and 
cooperation between agencies, and increasing agent accountability. 
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Centralization can save significant resources by eliminating 
duplicative redundancies, a particularly important effect for agency 
functions that require large up-front investments (such as the 
satellites needed for imagery intelligence). It can also improve 
efficiency by forcing cooperation at lower levels of bureaucracy and 
reducing turf wars. A common refrain heard in the post-9/11 
commission reports was that different agencies were “stovepiped”—
they did not share their information or analysis except at the highest 
levels of government, in failure to see the overall intelligence 
picture.136 Centralization might also improve accountability by 
reducing the ability of agents to slack in their work and blame others 
for failures. The unified direction of a single agency head will produce 
quicker decisions and actions—which was Hamilton’s justification for 
the Constitution’s creation of a single president at the head of the 
executive branch.137 
But as Anne Joseph O’Connell and Richard Posner have 
separately observed, centralization can also bring costs: the reduction 
of competition between agencies, excessive focus on consensus, and 
less consideration of low-probability yet high-magnitude threats.138 
Multiple agencies, for example, can help prevent the “group think” 
that can occur when a lack of diversity of viewpoints occurs in 
government decisionmaking.139 Principals will benefit if agencies have 
to race to the top to produce the best intelligence analysis or collect 
the most information, much as the private market forces firms to 
compete to offer the best goods at the best prices.140 Competition also 
acts as a safeguard in the event of a failure—it is less likely that a 
crippling fault will affect multiple agencies, thereby improving the 
reliability of the system overall.141 Increased competition will produce 
costs that mirror the benefits of centralization—slower 
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decisionmaking, reduced accountability, more expense in monitoring, 
and greater agency slack.142 
Neither centralization nor decentralization should be applied 
across the board. They represent polar opposites on a sliding scale of 
agency design, with the appropriate point depending on 
circumstances and agency mission. The military, for example, has 
elements of both unification and redundancy. The chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, as has been noted, is an effort at centralization, as was 
the creation of the Defense Department after the end of World War 
II. Each service’s maintenance of its own air capabilities, command 
staffs, and educational institutions is an example of redundancy. 
Redundancy can also occur between the military and intelligence 
community. The CIA has paramilitary units that bear strong 
similarities to the military’s special forces units, whereas the Pentagon 
consumes a large proportion of the intelligence budget through its 
collection and analysis agencies. 
Improving civilian control of the military would point toward 
reversing the trend toward centralization that has taken hold in both 
the military and intelligence worlds. At the point of policy 
development, multiple agencies may lead to more varied and higher 
quality advice. Competition would allow the principals to choose the 
proposals and programs of the individual services that best match 
their policy preferences on any given issue. Eliminating the monopoly 
on military advice of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for example, 
would allow more competition between the services in military 
analysis and planning. The services would compete to solve military 
problems posed by civilians principals—such as the most effective 
way to stabilize Iraq or pacify the Afghanistan countryside—just as 
different intelligence units might strive to present the best analysis of 
collected data. The prevailing service would take the lead in 
commanding the missions, which would result in greater resources 
and broader responsibilities. That dynamic would present the 
principals with more military options to achieve national goals, and 
would act as an important check on agency shirking. 
Competition may not just improve civilian control, but also may 
lead to better decisionmaking. This would be particularly important 
in areas where significant tradeoffs are present. To take Iraq as an 
example, it may be the case that defeat of the insurgency could take a 
 
 142. Id. at 1679–83. 
YOO IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:29:58 AM 
2308 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2277 
longer time but with less investment of resources and personnel, or 
that a faster strategy could be achieved but at the cost of a surge of 
new assets. There may be no correct answer as to how to strike this 
tradeoff as a matter of expert military advice. Rather, it should be a 
decision for the civilian principals about whether to incur higher costs 
for faster progress toward national goals, and competition among the 
services will allow them to understand the tradeoffs at stake. Such 
diversity of viewpoint might be particularly important as threats to 
national security themselves come in different guises. A broader array 
of approaches and insights will be necessary when the challenges are 
unprecedented. 
Decentralization might also be extended to competition in policy 
implementation, which would encompass issues of force structure. 
The redundancies in air support and special forces units has already 
been noted, though it should be acknowledged that specialization 
occurs in these units depending on the service involved (Navy Seals, 
for example, would focus on waterborne or amphibious operations). 
It might make sense for duplication to occur in specific areas in which 
competition in function is particularly desirable. In responding to the 
challenge presented by the al Qaeda terrorist network, for example, it 
is not immediately apparent that any one service has a natural 
advantage over the others. Allowing each service to develop special 
units designed to conduct operations against cells of al Qaeda agents 
may create a healthy competition. Civilian principals could choose to 
assign missions to those services whose approaches best fit their 
policy preferences, rather than those of the agents. 
To take one example, Marine and Army units could take 
responsibility for pacifying different provinces during the Iraq war. 
Each service could attempt different strategies for conducting 
counterinsurgency operations. One might try to reduce its footprint 
by retreating to large bases and conducting brief, intense missions 
because it believed that opposition grew in proportion to the visibility 
of American forces. The other might opt for a more consistent, visible 
presence in the hopes of winning the cooperation of moderate 
elements of Iraqi society. Civilians could judge which service 
encountered more success and direct additional resources and 
responsibilities to that service. The more options available to 
civilians, the more freedom they will have to choose policies that 
more closely follow their preferences. 
Or to take another example, the services may present different 
options for attacking selected terrorist leadership targets hiding in 
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areas with a high density of civilians. The Navy might propose cruise 
missiles, the Air Force could use air strikes by manned aircraft or 
unmanned aerial vehicles, and the Army could send in helicopters or 
special forces units. Competition among the services will present 
civilian decisionmakers with options along several different values, 
such as speed, accuracy, flexibility, and destructiveness. The 
principals will be able to choose the service that best presents a plan 
maximizing the values sought by the civilians, which itself will depend 
on the circumstances, rather than being limited to one course of 
action. 
As noted earlier, the introduction of more competition will not 
come without costs. Redundancy of capabilities between the services 
will increase costs and could lead to a waste of resources. The costs of 
the Air Force, Navy, and Marines operating different types of attack 
jets may well outweigh the benefits of specializing individual weapons 
systems for a service’s unique mission. Specialization yields important 
benefits, but redundancy might make less sense if large investments 
are required. It would make little sense, for example, for the Air 
Force to operate significant ground units. Decentralization might spur 
free-riding rather than competition. Or it might create a destructive 
competition and a race to the bottom if the services refuse to 
cooperate. Decentralization might also make civilian control of the 
military more difficult by making it more difficult to hold the military 
directly accountable for errors. 
Perhaps one way to address these concerns is to limit initial 
efforts at decentralization to the staff level. The costs of redundancy 
do not seem to be as pronounced at the planning stage or in the 
Pentagon, when heavy investments in duplicate military personnel or 
weapons systems are not required. This is similar to the conclusions 
that some scholars have reached with intelligence reform. It would 
not be cost effective for each intelligence agency to operate its own 
satellite reconnaissance system, but it would be relatively low cost to 
allow different agencies to view the same raw intelligence and 
develop their own conclusions. Similarly, the individual military 
services should continue to specialize in function, and even if they 
must cooperate in carrying out missions, military planning on strategy 
and policy could be opened to competition. Civilians would choose 
among individual proposals offered by the different services to carry 
out certain missions and functions. 
Special forces is another area in which gains in civilian control 
and effective decisionmaking might outweigh the costs of 
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redundancy. Such units are small and do not consume a large 
percentage of the services’ budgets. They could compete in 
addressing post-9/11 missions such as tracking and attacking terrorist 
leaders or blocking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Those units that proved superior in performing the mission could 
receive more funding and resources, and their strategies and tactics 
would serve as a model for others. Special forces may present a low-
cost way to experiment with more competition among the services 
without incurring large costs in redundancy. 
These types of solutions might increase interservice rivalry, 
which entails its own costs. Decentralization might also increase 
civilian control problems by creating more opportunities for 
individual services to ally with more congressional committees. But 
the American system of civil-military relations already assumes 
certain benefits from interservice rivalry. It already produces benefits 
from both competition and specialization which appear to outweigh 
the costs, at least to political and military leaders over time. Even 
though civilian leaders created the Department of Defense after 
World War II to increase centralized civilian control of military 
matters, they did not attempt to meld the individual services into a 
single force, and they still have not done so. The right mix of 
centralization and decentralization in the design of the military 
agencies will depend on the circumstances created by political history, 
the nature of the external threat, and the costs and benefits of more 
direct civilian control. I suggest here that when there is less 
agreement on the most effective policies because of an 
unprecedented form of external threat brought about by the end of 
the Cold War and an expanded understanding of the American 
position in the world, decentralization may create a healthy 
competition that provides civilian principals with more policy options 
and hence more control over their agents. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has sought to identify one of the most significant, but 
also understudied, aspects of administrative law that arose during the 
Bush administration: control over the military. It has explored a 
principal-agent model, built on rational choice approaches to the 
study of bureaucracy, to explain the apparent deterioration in civil-
military relations. That model also suggests ways, such as 
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decentralizing military command, in which civilian principals can 
increase their control over their agents, if that is their wish. 
As the Obama administration takes office, this approach suggests 
that problems in civilian-military relations will not disappear, but in 
fact might grow worse. As I have noted, the growing gap between 
military and civilian outlooks and values sets the environment for 
differences on individual policy preferences. In light of this gap, the 
Obama administration might have problems similar to those 
experienced by the Clinton and Bush administration. If that is the 
case, then the new administration will need to devote even more 
attention to the question of civilian control of the military than did 
the last. 
